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Abstract
We construct an endogenous growth model with automation (the introduction
of machines which replace low-skill labor) and horizontal innovation. The economy
follows three phases. First, low-skill wages are low, which induces little automa-
tion, and income inequality and labor’s share of GDP are constant. Second, as
low-skill wages increase, automation increases which reduces the labor share, in-
creases the skill premium and may decrease future low-skill wages. Finally, the
economy moves toward a steady state, where low-skill wages grow but at a lower
rate than high-skill wages. The model is quantitatively consistent with the US
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1 Introduction
How does the automation of production processes affect the distribution of income? By
allowing for the use of machines, automation reduces the demand for some type of labor,
particularly low-skill labor. This mechanism has received mounting empirical support
(e.g. Autor, Levy and Murnane, 2003),1 and it is often considered a major cause of the
sharp rise in income inequality in developed countries since 1970. The seemingly ever
increasing capabilities of machines only makes this concern more relevant today. Yet,
economists often argue that technological development also creates new products, which
boosts the demand for labor; and certainly, many of today’s jobs did not exist just a few
decades ago.
This paper is the first to develop an analytical framework in which the creation
of new products and the automation of the existing production processes interact to
drive changes in inequality and growth. Such a framework must center on the economic
incentives faced by innovators. Consequently, our framework is one of directed tech-
nical change between automation and horizontal innovation (the introduction of new
products), yet it departs from the previous literature in that it does not focus on factor-
augmenting technical change (such as Acemoglu, 1998). Contrary to that literature, our
framework is able to account for the following salient features of the evolution of the
income distribution in the last 40 years: a continuous increase in labor income inequality,
a decline in the labor share, and stagnating (possibly declining) real wages for low-skill
workers. In addition, the framework is malleable, which allows us to develop several
extensions. One such extension can account for a phase of wage polarization following
a phase of uniform increase in income inequality—consistent with the US experience.
The model can further be used quantitatively to jointly account for the evolutions of the
college premium and the labor share since the 1960s.
We consider an expanding variety growth model with low-skill and high-skill workers.
Horizontal innovation, modeled as in Romer (1990), increases the demand for both low-
and high-skill workers. Automation allows for the replacement of low-skill workers with
machines in production. It takes the form of a secondary innovation in existing prod-
uct lines, similar to secondary innovations in Aghion and Howitt (1996) (though their
focus is the interplay between applied and fundamental research, and not automation).
1Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) and Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) use cross-sectional data to
demonstrate that computerization is associated with relative shifts in demand favoring college educated
workers. Such evidence also exists at the firm level (Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw, 2007).
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Within a firm, automation increases the demand for high-skill workers but reduces the
demand for low-skill workers. We refer to products that can use machines as“automated”
products (and since each product is produced by a single firm, we will use the terms
interchangeably). “Non-automated” firms can only produce using low-skill and high-skill
labor. Once invented, a specific machine is produced with the same technology as the
consumption good.
We study the transitional dynamics of this economy and our results highlight the role
played by low-skill wages. The cost advantage of an automated over a non-automated
firm increases with the real wage of low-skill workers. As a result, an economy with an
initially low level of technology first goes through a phase where growth is mostly gen-
erated by horizontal innovation and the skill premium and the labor share are constant.
Only when low-skill wages are sufficiently high will firms invest in automation. During
this second phase, the share of automated products increases, low-skill workers lose rel-
atively to high-skill workers and, depending on parameters, the real low-skill wage may
temporarily decrease. The total labor share decreases progressively, in line with recent
evidence (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2013). Finally, the share of automated products
stabilizes as the entry of new, non-automated products compensates for the automation
of existing ones. In this third phase, low-skill wages grow asymptotically; intuitively,
the presence of non-automated products ensures that low-skill workers and machines are
only imperfect substitutes at the aggregate level. With an increasing quantity of ma-
chines, the relative cost of a low-skill worker and a machine, which here is also the real
wage, must grow. Yet, low-skill wages grow at a lower rate than high-skill wages, since
an increase in low-skill wages further increases the cost advantage of automated firms
and thereby the skill premium (thus the economy does not feature a balanced growth
path). The total labor share stabilizes and growth results mostly from automation.
Recent empirical work has increasingly found that workers in the middle of the income
distribution are most adversely affected by technological progress. To address this,
we extend the baseline model to include middle-skill workers as a separate skill-group.
Products either rely on low-skill or middle-skill workers (but not both) and the two
skill-groups are symmetric except that automating to replace middle-skill workers is
more costly (or alternatively machines are less productive in middle-skill firms). This
implies that the automation of low-skill workers’ tasks happens first, with a delayed
automation process for the tasks of middle-skill workers. We show that this difference
can reproduce important trends in the United States income distribution. In a first
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period, there is a uniform dispersion of the income distribution, as low-skill workers’
products are rapidly automated but middle-skill ones are not; while in the second period
there is wage polarization: low-skill workers’ share of automated products is stabilized,
and middle-skill products are more rapidly automated.
Finally, we extend the baseline model to include a supply response in the skill distri-
bution, and calibrate it to match the evolution of the skill premium, the skill ratio, the
labor share and productivity growth since the 60’s—as is common in the literature, for
this exercise (and only this exercise) we identify skill groups with education groups, such
that high-skill workers correspond to college-educated workers. This exercise demon-
strates that our model is able to replicate the trends in the data quantitatively.
There is a small theoretical literature on labor-replacing technology. In Zeira (1998),
firms have access to two technologies which differ in their capital intensity. Adoption of
the capital-intensive technology is analogous to automation in our model, and both are
encouraged by higher low-skill wages. In his model, higher low-skill wages are generated
exogenously by an increase in TFP, while in ours, low-skill wages endogenously increase
through horizontal innovation. Acemoglu (2010) shows that labor scarcity induces in-
novation (the Habbakuk hypothesis), if and only if innovation is labor-saving, that is,
if it reduces the marginal product of labor. Neither paper analyzes labor-replacing in-
novation in a fully dynamic model nor focuses on income inequality, as we do. Peretto
and Seater (2013) build a dynamic model of factor-eliminating technical change where
firms learn how to replace labor with capital, a process which bears strong similarities
with automation in our framework. They do not, however, focus on income inequality
and since their model only features one source of growth, wages are constant so that the
incentive to automate does not change over time. Benzell, Kotlikoff, LaGarda and Sachs
(2015), following Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012), build an overlapping generation model
where a code-capital stock can substitute for labor. A technological shock which favors
the accumulation of that type of capital can be immiserizing and lead to lower long-run
GDP by reducing wages and thereby reducing investment in physical capital.2 In both
papers (and contrary to our model), the technological shock is completely exogenous.
Finally, in work subsequent to our paper, Acemoglu and Restreppo (2015) also develop
a growth model where technological changes involves either automation or the creation
of new tasks. We discuss their model in details in section 3.7.
A large literature has used skill-biased technical change (SBTC) as a possible ex-
2We do not emphasize it, but an analogous result exists in our model: for some parameter values,
outright banning automation can result in higher long-run growth than in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
3
planation for the increase in the skill premium in developed countries since the 1970’s,
despite a large increase in the relative supply of skilled workers (see Hornstein, Krusell
and Violante, 2005, for a more complete literature review). One can categorize theo-
retical papers into one of three strands. The first strand emphasizes the hypothesis of
Nelson and Phelps (1966) that more skilled workers are better able to adapt to techno-
logical change, in which case a technological revolution (like the IT revolution) increases
the relative demand for skilled workers and increases income inequality. Several papers
have formalized this idea (including Aghion and Howitt, 1997; Lloyd-Ellis, 1999; Caselli,
1999; Galor and Moav, 2000, and Aghion, Howitt and Violante, 2002). However, such
theories mostly explain transitory increases in inequality whereas inequality has been in-
creasing for decades. Our model, on the contrary, introduces a mechanism that creates
permanent and widening inequality.
A second strand sees the complementarity between capital and skill as the source
for the increase in the skill premium. Krusell, Ohanian, R´ıos-Rull and Violante (2000)
formalize this idea by developing a framework where capital equipment and high-skill
labor are complements. To this, they add the empirically observed increase in the stock
of capital equipment, and show that their model can account for most of the variation in
the skill premium. Our model shares features with their framework: machines play an
analogous role to capital equipment in their model, since they are more complementary
with high-skill labor than with low-skill labor. The focus of our paper is different though
since we seek to explain why innovation has been directed towards automation.
Finally, a third branch of the literature, originally presented by Katz and Murphy
(1992), considers technology to be either high-skill or low-skill labor augmenting. This
approach has been used empirically within a relative supply and demand framework of
these two skill groups—typically college and non-college graduates—to infer the extent
of skill-biased technical change from changes in the relative labor supply and the skill
premium. For instance, Goldin and Katz (2008) find that in the US, technical change
has been skill-biased throughout the 20th century. On the theory side, the directed
technical change literature (most notably Acemoglu, 1998, 2002 and 2007) also uses
factor-augmenting technical change models to endogenize the bias of technical change.
Such models deliver important insights about inequality and technical change, but they
have no role for labor-replacing technology (a point emphasized in Acemoglu and Autor,
2011). In addition, even though income inequality varies, neither high-skill nor low-skill
wages can decrease in absolute terms, and their asymptotic growth rates must be the
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same. The present model is also a directed technical change framework as economic in-
centives determine whether technical change takes the form of horizontal innovation or
automation, but it deviates from the assumption of factor-augmenting technologies and
explicitly allows for labor-replacing automation, generating the possibility for (tempo-
rary) absolute losses for low-skill workers, and permanently increasing income inequality.
More recently, Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006, 2008) and Autor and Dorn (2013),
amongst others, show that whereas income inequality has continued to increase above
the median, there has been a reversal below the median. They argue that the rou-
tine tasks performed by many middle-skill workers—storing, processing and retriev-
ing information—are more easily done by computers than those performed by low-skill
workers, now predominantly working in service occupations. This “wage polarization”
has been accompanied by a “job polarization” as employment has followed the same
pattern of decreasing employment in middle-skill occupations.3 Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) argue that a task-based model where technological progress explicitly allows the
replacement of one input, e.g. labor, by another, e.g. capital, in the production of some
tasks provides a better explanation for wage and job polarization than factor augment-
ing technical change models (and in addition, allows for a decrease in the absolute level
of wages).4 In the present paper, automation similarly replaces labor with machines
in different tasks (which correspond to the production of different goods). However,
whereas this literature has so far considered static models, our framework is dynamic
and endogenizes the arrival of automation. In addition, it provides a unified explanation
for the relative decline of middle-skill wages since the mid-1980s and the relative decline
of low-skill wages in the period before.
Section 2 introduces the baseline model and defines the equilibrium. Section 3 de-
scribes the evolution of the economy through three phases and derives the asymptotic
steady-state. Section 4 extends the model to analyze wage polarization. Section 5 cali-
brates an extended version of the model (with an endogenous labor supply response in
the skill distribution) to the US economy since the 1960s. Section 6 concludes.
3This phenomenon has also been observed and associated with the automation of routine tasks
in Europe (Spitz-Oener, 2006, and Goos, Manning and Salomons, 2009). Another explanation for
polarization stems from the consumption side and relates the high growth rate of wages for the least-
skilled workers with an increase in the demand for services from the most-skilled—and richest—workers,
see Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013) and Ba´ra´ny and Siegel (2014).
4A related literature analyzes this non-monotonic pattern in inequality changes through the lens of
assignment models where workers of different skill levels are matched to tasks of different skill pro-
ductivities (e.g. Costinot and Vogel, 2010; Burstein, Morales and Vogel, 2014 and Feng and Graetz,
2015).
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2 The Baseline Model
2.1 Preferences and production
We consider a continuous time infinite-horizon economy populated by H high-skill and
L low-skill workers. Both types of workers supply labor inelastically and have identical
preferences over a single final good of:
Uk,t =
ˆ ∞
t
e−ρ(τ−t)
C1−θk,τ
1− θdτ,
where ρ is the discount rate, θ ≥ 1 is the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution
and Ck,t is consumption of the final good at time t by group k ∈ {H,L}. H and L
are kept constant in our baseline model, but we consider the case where workers choose
occupations based on relative wages and heterogeneous skill-endowments in Section 5.1.
The final good is produced by a competitive industry combining an endogenous set
of intermediate inputs, i ∈ [0, Nt] using a CES aggregator:
Yt =
(ˆ Nt
0
yt(i)
σ−1
σ di
) σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between these inputs and yt(i) is the use
of intermediate input i at time t. As in Romer (1990), an increase in Nt represents
a source of technological progress. Throughout the paper, we use interchangeably the
terms “intermediate inputs” or “products”.
We normalize the price of Yt to 1 at all points in time and drop time subscripts when
there is no ambiguity. The demand for each intermediate input i is:
y(i) = p(i)−σY, (1)
where p(i) is the price of intermediate input i and the normalization implies that the
ideal price index, [
´ Nt
0
p(i)1−σdi]1/(1−σ) equals 1.
Each intermediate input is produced by a monopolist who owns the perpetual rights
of production. She can produce the intermediate input by combining low-skill labor, l(i),
high-skill labor, h(i), and, possibly, type-i machines, x(i), using the production function:
y(i) =
[
l(i)
−1
 + α(i) (ϕ˜x (i))
−1

] β
−1
h(i)1−β, (2)
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where α(i) ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function for whether or not the monopolist has access
to an automation technology which allows for the use of machines. If the product is not
automated (α(i) = 0), production takes place using a standard Cobb-Douglas production
function with only low-skill and high-skill labor with a low-skill factor share of β. If the
product is automated (α(i) = 1) it can also use machines in the production process. We
assume that the elasticity of substitution between machines and low-skill workers, , is
strictly greater than 1 and allow for perfect substitutability, in which case  = ∞ and
the production function is y(i) = [l(i) + α(i)ϕ˜x (i)]β h(i)1−β. The parameter ϕ˜ is the
relative productivity advantage of machines over low-skill workers. We will denote by G
the share of automated products.
Since each input is produced by a single firm, from now on we identify each input with
its firm and therefore we will also refer to a firm which produces an automated product
as an automated firm. We refer to the specific labor inputs provided by high-skill and
low-skill workers in the production of different inputs as “different tasks” performed by
these workers, so that each products comes with its own tasks. It is because α(i) is
not fixed, but changes over time, that our model captures the notion that machines can
replace low-skill labor in new tasks. A model in which α(i) were fixed for each product
would only allow for machines to be used more intensively in production, but always for
the same tasks.
Throughout the paper we will refer to x as “machines”, though our interpretation
also includes any form of computer inputs, algorithms, the services of cloud-providers,
etc. For simplicity, we consider that machines depreciate immediately, but Appendix 7.4
relaxes this assumption. Once invented, machines of type i are produced competitively
one for one with the final good, so that the price of an existing machine for an automated
firm is always equal to 1. Though a natural starting point, this is an important assump-
tion and Appendix 7.3 presents a version of the model which relaxes it. Importantly,
this does not imply that our model cannot capture the notion of a decline in the real
cost of equipment: indeed, automation for firm i can equivalently be interpreted as a
decline of the price of machines i from infinity to 1.
2.2 Innovation
There are two sources of technological progress in this model: automation and hor-
izontal innovation. We assume that an automated firm remains so forever and that
becoming automated requires an investment. More specifically, a non-automated firm
7
which hires hAt (i) high-skill workers in automation research, becomes automated accord-
ing to a Poisson process with rate ηGκ˜tN
κ
t h
A
t (i)
κ. η > 0 denotes the productivity of the
automation technology, κ ∈ (0, 1) measures the concavity of the automation technology,
Gκ˜t , κ˜ ∈ [0, κ], represents possible knowledge spillovers from the share of automated
products, and Nκt represents knowledge spillovers from the total number of intermediate
inputs (these spillovers are necessary to ensure that both automation and horizontal in-
novation can take place in the long-run).5 We define the total mass of high-skill workers
working in automation: HAt ≡
´ Nt
0
hAt (i)di. Our set-up can be interpreted in two ways.
From one standpoint, machines are intermediate input-specific and each producer needs
to invent his own machine, which, once invented, is produced with the same technology
as the consumption good.6 From a second standpoint, machines are produced by the fi-
nal good sector, and each intermediate input producer must spend resources in adapting
machines to his product line so as to make them substitutable with low-skill workers in
a new set of tasks.7
Horizontal innovation occurs in a standard manner. New intermediate inputs are
developed by high-skill workers according to a linear technology with productivity γNt
(where γ > 0 measures the productivity of the horizontal innovation technology).8 With
HDt high-skill workers pursuing horizontal innovation, the mass of intermediate inputs
evolves according to:
N˙t = γNtH
D
t .
We assume that firms do not exist before their product is created. Coupled with our
5An alternative way of interpreting this functional form is the following: let there be a mass 1 of firms
with Nt products (instead of assuming that each individual i is a distinct firm), then this functional
form means that when a firm hires a mass Nth
A
t of high-skill workers in automation each of its products
gets independently automated with a Poisson rate of ηGκ˜t
(
Nth
A
t
)κ
.
6Alternatively, machine-i may be invented by an outside firm and then sold to the intermediate
input producer. With such market structure the rents from automation would be divided between
the intermediate input producer and the machine producer. Except for a constant representing the
bargaining power of each party, it would not affect any of our results. Yet another alternative would
be to have entrants undertaking automation and potentially displacing the original firm. This would
not qualitatively affect the equilibrium as long as the incumbent has a positive probability of becoming
automated.
7Alternatively, we could have assumed that some products share the same tasks. If the automation
technology is proprietary this does not affect our analysis at all. Otherwise, once the low-skill worker
task is automated in one product then it would be automated in all products sharing the same low-skill
task. Qualitatively, this does not affect our analysis as long as some of the new products come with
new tasks.
8As is common in the growth literature, in this set-up each firm is assumed to produce a good
different from the others. Horizontal innovation, however, does not aim to represent the creation of new
firms but the creation of new goods or services.
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assumption that automation follows a continuous Poisson process, new products must
then be born non-automated. This feature of the model is motivated by the idea that
when a task is new and unfamiliar, the flexibility and outside experiences of workers
allow them to solve unforeseen problems. As the task becomes routine and potentially
codifiable a machine (or an algorithm) can perform it (as argued by Autor, 2013). In
reality, some new tasks may be sufficiently close to older ones that no additional invest-
ment would be required to automate them immediately. As explained in section 3.7, our
results still carry through if we assume that only a share of the new products are born
non-automated or even if automation is only undertaken at the entry stage.
Define HPt ≡
´ Nt
0
ht(i)di as the total mass of high-skill workers involved in produc-
tion. Factor markets clearing implies that
ˆ Nt
0
lt(i)di = L, H
A
t +H
D
t +H
P
t = H. (3)
2.3 Equilibrium wages
In this subsection, we take the technological levels N , G and the mass of high-skill
workers in production HP as given and show how low-skill wages (denoted w) and high-
skill wages (denoted v) are determined in equilibrium. First, note that all automated
firms are symmetric and therefore behave in the same way. Similarly all non-automated
firms are symmetric. This allows us to rewrite aggregate output as:
Y = N
1
σ−1×G 1σ ([(LA) −1 + (ϕ˜X) −1 ] β−1 (HP,A)1−β)σ−1σ + (1−G) 1σ ((LNA)β (HP,NA)1−β)σ−1σ

σ
σ−1
,
(4)
where LA (respectively LNA) is the total mass of low-skill workers in automated (re-
spectively non-automated) firms, HP,A (respectively HP,NA) is the total mass of high-
skill workers hired in production in automated (respectively non-automated) firms and
X =
´ N
0
x(i)di is total use of machines. Therefore the aggregate production function
takes the form of a nested CES, where G is the share parameter of the “automated”
products nest and N
1
σ−1 is a TFP parameter.
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The unit cost of intermediate input i is given by:
c(w, v, α(i)) = β−β(1− β)−(1−β) (w1− + ϕα(i)) β1− v1−β, (5)
where ϕ ≡ ϕ˜. When  <∞, c(·) is strictly increasing in both w and v and c(w, v, 1) <
c(w, v, 0) for all w, v > 0 (automation reduces costs). The monopolist charges a constant
markup over costs such that the price is p(i) = σ/(σ − 1) · c(w, v, α(i)).
Using Shepard’s lemma and equations (1) and (5) delivers the demand for low-skill
labor of a single firm.
l(w, v, α(i)) = β
w−
w1− + ϕα(i)
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ
c(w, v, α(i))1−σY, (6)
which is decreasing in w and v. The effect of automation on demand for low-skill labor
in a given firm is generally ambiguous. This is due to the combination of a negative
substitution effect (the ability of the firm to substitute machines for low-skill workers)
and a positive scale effect (the ability of the firm to employ machines decreases overall
costs, lowers prices and increases production). Here we focus on labor-substituting
innovation and impose throughout that µ ≡ β(σ − 1)/(− 1) < 1 (that is the elasticity
of substitution between machines and low-skill labor is large enough), which is necessary
and sufficient for the substitution effect to dominate and ensures l(w, v, 1) < l(w, v, 0)
for all w, v > 0.
Let x (w, v) denote the use of a machines by an automated firm. The relative use of
machines and low-skill labor for such a firm is then:
x(w, v)/l(w, v, 1) = ϕw, (7)
which is increasing in w as the real wage is also the price of low-skill labor relative to
machines.
The iso-elastic demand (1), coupled with constant mark-up σ/(σ − 1), implies that
revenues are given by R(w, v, α(i)) = ((σ − 1) /σ)σ−1 c(w, v, α(i))1−σY and that a share
1/σ of revenues accrues to the monopolists as profits: pi(w, v, α(i)) = R(w, v, α(i))/σ.
Aggregate profits are then a constant share 1/σ of output Y , since output is equal to the
aggregate revenues of intermediate inputs firms. Using (5), the relative revenues (and
10
profits) of non-automated and automated firms are given by:
R(w, v, 0)
R(w, v, 1)
=
pi(w, v, 0)
pi(w, v, 1)
=
(
1 + ϕw−1
)−µ
, (8)
which is a decreasing function of w. Since non-automated firms rely more heavily on
low-skill labor, their relative market share drops with higher low-skill wages.9
The share of revenues in a firm accruing to high-skill labor in production is the same
whether a firm is automated or not and given by νh = (1 − β)(σ − 1)/σ. Aggregating
over all high-skill workers in production, we get that
vHP = (1− β)σ − 1
σ
N [GR(w, v, 1) + (1−G)R(w, v, 0)] = (1− β)σ − 1
σ
Y. (9)
Using factor demand functions, the share of revenues accruing to low-skill labor is
given by νl(w, v, α(i)) =
σ−1
σ
β (1 + ϕw−1α(i))−1, and is lower for automated than non-
automated firms. The aggregate revenues of low-skill workers can be obtained by sum-
ming up over all intermediate inputs:
wL = N [GR(w, v, 1)νl(w, v, 1) + (1−G)R(w, v, 0)νl(w, v, 0)] . (10)
Taking the ratio of (9) over (10) and using (8) gives the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For  <∞, the high-skill wage premium is given by10
v
w
=
1− β
β
L
HP
G+ (1−G)(1 + ϕw−1)−µ
G (1 + ϕw−1)−1 + (1−G)(1 + ϕw−1)−µ . (11)
For given L/HP and G > 0, the skill premium is increasing in the absolute level of
low-skill wages, which means that if G is bounded above 0, low-skill wages cannot grow
at the same rate as high-skill wages in the long-run. This is the case because higher
low-skill wages both induce more substitution towards machines in automated firms (as
9The model predicts that the ratio of high-skill to low-skill labor in production is higher for automated
than non-automated firms (the model features “machine-skill complementarity”). However, this does
not necessarily mean that automated firms have a higher ratio of high-skill to low-skill labor overall,
since non-automated firms also hire high-skill workers for the purpose of automating. In particular,
new firms do not always have a higher ratio of low to high-skill workers (in addition at a the time of its
birth a new firm only relies on high-skill workers).
10When machines and low-skill workers are perfect substitutes,  =∞, the skill premium is given by
v
w =
1−β
β
L
HP
if w < ϕ˜−1 such that no firm uses machines, and vw =
1−β
β
L
HP
G+(1−G)(ϕ˜w)−1
(1−G)(ϕ˜w)−1 if w > ϕ˜
−1.
11
reflected by the term (1 + ϕw−1)−1 in equation (11)) and improve the cost-advantage
and therefore the market share of automated firms (term (1 + ϕw−1)−µ ).
With constant mark-ups, the cost equation (5) and the price normalization give:
(
G
(
ϕ+ w1−
)µ
+ (1−G)wβ(1−σ)) 11−σ v1−β = σ − 1
σ
ββ (1− β)1−β N 1σ−1 . (12)
We label this a productivity condition, as it shows the positive relationship between real
wages and the level of technology given by N , the number of intermediate inputs, and G
the share of automated firms. Together (11) and (12) determine real wages as a function
of technology N,G and the mass of high-skill workers engaged in production HP .
Though the production function implies that, at the firm level, the elasticity of
substitution between high-skill labor and machines is equal to that between high-skill
and low-skill labor, this does not imply that the same holds at the aggregate level.
Therefore our paper is not in contradiction to Krusell et al. (2000), who argue that the
aggregate elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-skill labor is greater than
the one between high-skill labor and machines.11
Given the amount of resources devoted to production (L,HP ), the static equilibrium
is closed by the final good market clearing condition:
Y = C +X (13)
where C = CL + CH is total consumption. Y differs from GDP for two reasons: it
includes intermediate inputs and it does not include R&D investments, which are done
by high-skill labor. Hence, we have:
GDP = Y −X + v (HD +HA) . (14)
2.4 Innovation allocation
We now study how innovation is determined in equilibrium. We denote by V At the value
of an automated firm, by rt the economy-wide interest rate and by pi
A
t ≡ pi(wt, vt, 1) the
profits at time t of an automated firm. The asset pricing equation for an automated firm
11In fact, the Morishima elasticity of substitution between high-skill labor and low-skill labor is close
to 1 when low-skill wages are low and close to 1 + β(σ − 1) when they are high; while the one between
high-skill labor and machines is close to  in the former case and to 1 in the latter, so that the ordering
is reversed as low-skill wages grow (see Appendix 8.1.4).
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is then given by
rtV
A
t = pi
A
t + V˙
A
t . (15)
This equation states that the required return on holding an automated firm, V At , must
equal the instantaneous profits plus appreciation. An automated firm only maximizes
instantaneous profits and has no intertemporal investment decisions to make.
A non-automated firm has to decide how much to invest in automation. Denoting by
V Nt the value of a non-automated firm, we get the corresponding asset pricing equation:
rtV
N
t = pi
N
t + ηG
κ˜
t
(
Nth
A
t
)κ (
V At − V Nt
)− vthAt + V˙ Nt , (16)
where piNt ≡ pi(wt, vt, 0) and hAt is the mass of high-skill workers hired in automation
research by a single non-automated firm (so that HAt = (1 − Gt)NthAt ). This equation
has an analogous interpretation to equation (15), except that profits are augmented
by the instantaneous expected gain from innovation ηGκ˜t
(
Nth
A
t
)κ (
V At − V Nt
)
net of
expenditure on automation research, vth
A
t . The first order condition for automation
innovation follows as:
κηGκ˜tN
κ
t
(
hAt
)κ−1 (
V At − V Nt
)
= vt, (17)
which must hold at all points in time. The mass of high-skill workers hired in automation
increases with the difference in value between automated and non-automated firms, and
as such is increasing in current and future low-skill wages—all else equal.
Since non-automated firms get automated at Poisson rate ηGκ˜t
(
Nth
A
t
)κ
, and since
new firms are born non-automated, the share of automated firms obeys:
G˙t = ηG
κ˜
t
(
Nth
A
t
)κ
(1−Gt)−GtgNt , (18)
where gNt denotes the growth rate of Nt, the number of products.
Free-entry in horizontal innovation guarantees that the value of creating a new firm
cannot be greater than its opportunity cost:
γNtV
N
t ≤ vt, (19)
with equality whenever there is strictly positive horizontal innovation (N˙t > 0).
Finally, the low-skill and high-skill representative households’ problems are standard
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and lead to Euler equations which in combination give
C˙t/Ct = (rt − ρ) /θ, (20)
with a transversality condition requiring that the present value of all time-t assets in the
economy (the aggregate value of all firms) is asymptotically zero:
limt→∞
(
exp
(
−
ˆ t
0
rsds
)
Nt
(
(1−Gt)V Nt +GtV At
))
= 0.
2.5 Equilibrium characterization
We define a feasible allocation and an equilibrium as follows:
Definition 1. A feasible allocation is defined by time paths of stock of prod-
ucts and share of those that are automated, [Nt, Gt]
∞
t=0, time paths of use of low-
skill labor, high-skill labor, and machines in the production of intermediate inputs
[lt(i), ht(i), xt(i)]
∞
i∈[0,Nt],t=0, a time path of intermediate inputs production [yt(i)]
∞
i∈[0,Nt],t=0,
time paths of high-skill workers engaged in automation [hAt (i)]
∞
i∈[0,Nt],t=0, and in hori-
zontal innovation [HDt ]
∞
t=0, time paths of final good production and consumption levels
[Yt, Ct]
∞
t=0 such that factor markets clear ((3) holds) and good market clears ((13) holds).
Definition 2. An equilibrium is a feasible allocation, a time path of intermediate
input prices [pt(i)]
∞
i∈[0,Nt],t=0, a time path for low-skill wages, high-skill wages, interest rate
and the value of non-automated and automated firms
[
wt, vt, rt, V
N
t , V
A
t
]∞
t=0
such that
[yt(i)]
∞
i∈[0,Nt],t=0 maximizes final good producer profits, [pt(i), lt(i), ht(i), xt(i)]
∞
i∈[0,Nt],t=0
maximize intermediate inputs producers’ profits, [hAt (i)]
∞
i∈[0,Nt],t=0 maximizes the value
of non-automated firms, [HDt ]
∞
t=0 is determined by free entry, [Ct]
∞
t=0 is consistent with
consumer optimization and the transversality condition is satisfied.
In order to work with a system with an asymptotic steady-state; we introduce nt ≡
N
−β/[(1−β)(1+β(σ−1))]
t and ωt ≡ wβ(1−σ)t which both tend towards 0 as Nt and wt tend
towards infinity. We define the normalized mass of high-skill workers in automation
(hˆAt ≡ NthAt ), normalized high-skill wages (vˆt = vtN−ψt ), where ψ ≡ ((1− β) (σ − 1))−1
(ψ is equal to the asymptotic elasticity of GDP with respect to Nt), and the variable
χt ≡ cˆtθ/vˆt. With positive entry in the creation of new products at all points in time,
the equilibrium can then be characterized by a system of differential equations with two
state variables nt, Gt, two control variables, hˆ
A
t , χt and an auxiliary equation defining ωt
(see Appendix 7.1 for the derivation, in particular the system is given by equations (26),
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(27), (29) and (30)). We then get:
Proposition 1. Assume that
ρ
(
1
ηκκ (1− κ)1−κ
(
ρ
γ
)1−κ
+
1
γ
)
< ψH, (21)
then the system of differential equations admits a steady-state (n∗, G∗, hˆA∗, χ∗) with n∗ =
0, G∗ > 0 and positive growth
(
gN
)∗
> 0. In such a steady-state, G∗ < 1.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.1.
We will refer to the steady-state (n∗, G∗, hˆA∗, χ∗) as as an asymptotic steady-state
for our original system of differential equations. In addition, the assumption that θ ≥
1 ensures that the transversality condition always holds.12 For the rest of the paper
we restrict attention to parameters such that there exists a unique saddle-path stable
steady-state (n∗, G∗, hˆA∗, χ∗) with n∗ = 0, G∗ > 0. Then, for an initial pair (N0, G0) ∈
(0,∞) × [0, 1] sufficiently close to the asymptotic steady-state, the model features a
unique equilibrium converging towards the asymptotic steady-state.13 The proposition
further stipulates that G∗ < 1, which is derived from (27) with G˙t = 0 and gNt > 0.
3 The Three Phases of the Transition
This section analyzes the transitional dynamics from an initial starting point of (N0, G0)
to the asymptotic steady state. We initially briefly discuss our baseline choice of pa-
rameters. Thereafter, we show that the transitional dynamics are best considered as
consisting of three phases which we characterize through a combination of analytic and
simulation methods.14 Then, we analytically characterize the steady-state and finally,
we consider other parameter choices.
12To see the intuition behind equation (21), consider the case in which the efficiency of the automation
technology η is arbitrarily large, such that the model is arbitrarily close to a Romer model where all
firms are automated. Then equation (21) becomes ρ/γ < ψH, which mirrors the classical condition
for positive growth in a Romer model with linear innovation technology. With a smaller η the present
value of a new product is reduced such that the corresponding condition is more stringent
13Multiple asymptotic steady-states are technically possible but are not likely for reasonable parameter
values (see Appendix 8.1.2). In addition, with two state variables (nt and Gt) saddle path stability
requires exactly two eigenvalues with positive real parts. In our numerical investigation, for all parameter
combinations which satisfy the previous restrictions, this condition was always met.
14We employ the so-called “relaxation” algorithm for solving systems of discretized differential equa-
tions (Trimborn, Koch and Steger, 2008). See Appendix 8.2 for details.
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Table 1: Baseline Parameter Specification
σ  β H L θ η κ ϕ˜ ρ κ˜ γ
3 4 2/3 1/3 2/3 2 0.2 0.5 0.25 0.02 0 0.3
Table 1 presents our baseline parameters. Section 5 employs Bayesian techniques
to estimate the parameters, but the focus of this section is theoretical and we simply
choose “reasonable” parameters (see Appendix 7.2.5 for a systematic exploration of the
parameter space). As our goal is to characterize the evolution of an economy which
transitions from automation playing a small to a central role, we choose an initially low
level of automation (G0 = 0.001) and an initial mass of intermediate inputs small enough
to ensure that the real wage is initially low relative to the productivity of machines. The
characterization of the equilibrium in 3 phases is robust to considering other parameter
sets with low G0 as long as N0 is sufficiently low to imply little initial incentive to
automate. More generally, in the following, we will carefully specify which features of
the equilibrium are specific to the set of parameters and which ones are more general.
The time unit is 1 year. Total stock of labor is 1 and we set L = 2/3 and β = 2/3 such
that absent automation and if all high-skill workers were in production the skill premium
would be 1. The initial mass of products is N0 = 1 and the productivity parameter for
machines is ϕ˜ = 0.25, which ensures that at t = 0, the cost advantage of automated
firms is very small (their profits are 0.004% higher). We set σ = 3 to capture an initial
labor share close to 2/3. The elasticity of substitution between machines and low-skill
workers in automated firms is  = 4. The innovation parameters (γ, η, κ) are chosen
such that GDP growth is close to 2% both initially and asymptotically, and we first
consider the case where there is no externality from the share of automated products
in the automation technology, κ˜ = 0—hereafter, we will refer to this externality as the
externality in automation technology (although there is also an externality from the
total mass of products). The parameters ρ and θ are chosen such that the interest rate
is around 6% (at the beginning and at the end of the transition). For any variable at we
let gat ≡ a˙t/at denote its growth rate and for future reference we let ga∞ ≡ limt→∞a˙t/at
denote its asymptotic limit (if such exists).
3.1 Phase 1: almost balanced growth
Figure 1 plots the evolution of the economy. We initially focus on the first 100 years of
the transition which we denote “Phase 1”. With a low initial level of Nt, low-skill wages
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are low, and as shown in Panel C, the profits of an automated firm are only slightly
higher than that of a non-automated firm (equation (8)). Non-automated firms invest
little in automation and Gt remains low (Panel C). The economy behaves essentially as if
the aggregate production function were Cobb-Douglas: wages of both high- and low-skill
workers grow at the rate of GDP (Panel A) and the labor share is constant (Panel D).
Economic growth is (almost) entirely driven by the introduction of new products.15
Year
Pe
r c
en
t
Panel A: Growth Rates of Wages and GDP
 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
0 100 200 300 4000
1
2
3
4 gGDP
gw
gv
Panel B: Profit ratio and Skillpremium
Year
lo
g 
un
its
 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
0 100 200 300 4000
2
4
6
profit ratio
skillpremium
0 100 200 300 4000
5
10
15
Pe
r c
en
t
Year
 
 
Panel C: Research Expenditures and G
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
0
50
100
Autom./GDP (left)
Hori./GDP (left) G (right)
Year
Pe
r c
en
t
Panel D: Factor Shares
 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
0 100 200 300 4000
50
100
Total labor share
Low−skill labor share
Figure 1: Transitional Dynamics for baseline parameters. Panel A shows yearly growth rates
for GDP, low-skill wages (w) and high-skill wages (v), Panel B the profit ratio of
automated and non-automated firms and the relative pay of high-skill and low-skill
wages, Panel C the total spending on horizontal innovation and automation as well
as the share of products that are automated (G), and Panel D the wage share of
GDP for total wages and low-skill wages.
To give further intuition, Figure 2a plots the skill-premium (11) and productivity
(12) conditions in (w, v) space. It shows how wages depend on the number of products,
Nt, the share of automated products, Gt, and the mass of high-skill workers employed
in production HPt . For Gt close to 0, equation (11) places the skill premium just above
the straight line with slope (1 − β)L/(βHPt ) (represented by a dotted line). During
this phase, HPt remains nearly constant (as the ratio of research expenditures to GDP
15With a higher G0 but still a low N0, firms would still have had a low incentive to automate. As a
result Gt would initially decline with the entry of new, non-automated products so that the transitional
dynamics would quickly look similar to the present case (see Appendix 7.2.5).
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remains nearly constant). With nearly constant Gt and H
P
t , the skill premium condition
barely moves. The increase in Nt pushes the productivity condition out, which increases
low-skill and high-skill wages proportionally.
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Figure 2: Evolution of high-skill (vt) and low-skill (wt) wages across the three phases. In
Phases 1 and 3, G is (nearly) constant, only the productivity condition moves
and both high- and low-skill wages increase. During Phase 2, G changes as well,
which pivots the skill-premium counter-clockwise, and might (temporarily) reduce
low-skill wages.
3.2 Phase 2: acceleration in automation
As low-skill wages grow, the relative profitability of automated firms rise (Panel B in
Figure 1) and the second phase of the transition is initiated around year 100. To facilitate
exposition we describe the evolution of key variables sequentially.
Innovat n. The immediate effect of higher relative profitability for automated
firms, is an increase in spending on automation from an initial negligible level to around
4 per cent of GDP (Panel C). More precisely, since innovators are forward looking,
it is the increase in the relative profitability of automated firms in the future which
affects their incentive to automate.16 In addition the share of spending on horizontal
innovation declines, particularly because new (non-automated) products will compete
with increasingly productive automated firms and therefore get a smaller initial market
share—the increase in automation spending at some point in Phase 2 is a general feature
16Note that the cost of automation, namely high-skill wages divided by the number of products, Nt,
is also changing over time. Yet, high-skill wages and aggregate profits grow at a similar rate. Therefore
when the share of automated products, Gt, is low, high-skill wages divided by Nt and the profits of a
non-automated firm grow at similar rates, while profits of an automated firms grow faster. This is why
the increase in the cost of automation is dominated by the increase in its benefits, and therefore firms
start investing more in automation at the beginning of Phase 2.
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of the model but the decrease in horizontal innovation is not. The change in innovation
spending directly increases the fraction of automated products, Gt (Panel C).
17
Labor income inequality. The increase in the share of automated products, Gt,
changes the relative growth rates of low- and high-skill wages. As shown in Panel A in
Figure 1, the growth rate of high-skill wages approaches 4%, while the growth rate of
low-skill wages goes down to around 1% (since there are no financial constraints, the
two types share a common consumption growth rate throughout, see Appendix 7.2.1).
During Phase 2 (Figure 2b), Nt continues to increase, which pushes out the pro-
ductivity condition. This increases both high-skill and low-skill wages, though the skill
premium rises as a result of the upward-bending skill-premium condition (Lemma 1).
Intuitively, the rise in the low-skill wages increases the market share of automated firms,
which rely relatively less on low-skill workers.
The increase in Gt has a positive effect on high-skill wages, but an ambiguous effect
on low-skill wages. Indeed, an increase in the share of automated products has two
opposing effects: i) an aggregate productivity effect as higher automation increases the
productive capability of the economy and pushes out the productivity condition and
ii) an aggregate substitution effect as it allows the economy to more easily substitute
away from low-skill labor which pivots the skill-premium condition counter-clockwise.
In the vocabulary of Acemoglu (2010), automation is low-skill labor saving whenever
the aggregate substitution effect dominates the aggregate productivity effect. Which
effect dominates here is generally ambiguous but when β/(1− β) < − 1, that is when
the elasticity of substitution between machines and low-skill workers is sufficiently high
(the case for the parameters chosen here), w is decreasing in G for low N and “inverse
u”-shaped in G for a large N . Intuitively, when N and therefore w is low, the productive
capabilities of the economy are not much improved by automation and the wage of low-
skill workers is always decreasing in G. With higher N , the automation of the first
products has a large productivity effect for the economy, while the substitution effect
is relatively small since most firms are still non-automated; with the reverse being true
for the automation of the last products. When β/(1− β) < − 1, it further holds that
a fully automated economy will give low-skill workers lower wages than a completely
non-automated one: w|G=0 > w|G=1 (proof in Appendix 8.1.3 which also considers the
case of β/(1− β) > − 1).
17Our assumption that all non-automated firms are symmetric ensures that these firms hire the same
amount of high-skill workers in automation. With heterogeneous automation technologies, there would
still be two phases but the transition would be smoother (G would increase less rapidly).
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It is precisely this movement of the skill-premium curve that an alternative model
with constantG (i.e. one where the fraction of tasks that can be performed with machines
is constant) could not reproduce, and consequently such a model would not feature labor-
saving innovation. For this simulation, the increase in Gt always has a negative impact
on low-skill wages, but it is sufficiently slow relative to the increase in Nt that low-skill
wages grow at a positive rate throughout. Importantly, this is not a general result. As
shown below, there are parameters for which the growth rate of low-skill wages can be
negative during Phase 2.
In addition to the effects of changing Gt and Nt, changes in the mass of high-skill
workers in production, HPt , affect the skill premium. As high-skill labor is the only
factor used in innovation, an increase in the mass of high-skill workers used in inno-
vation increases the skill premium. For our present simulation, HPt decreases slightly
(when automation starts) and then increases later (when horizontal innovation declines),
though this is not a general result. These effects on the skill premium are quantitatively
dominated by the changes in use of machines in production.
Elasticity of substitution. At the aggregate level, our model boils down to a nested
CES production function (see equation (4)), and Phase 2 corresponds to a period where
the share parameter of the composite which features substitutability between machines
and low-skill labor, Gt, rises. This change in the share parameter is microfunded within
our model and receives a very natural interpretation, which is precisely the advantage
of a task framework. In contrast, the academic debate on income distribution often
focuses on the value of the elasticity of substitution between different factors. Here the
value of the aggregate elasticity of substitution does not play the central role. In fact, the
Morishima’s elasticity of substitution between low-skill labor and machines (or machines
and low-skill labor) actually declines in Phase 2 from a value close to  to a value close
to 1 + β(σ − 1) (see Appendix 8.1.4).
Capital and labor shares. The second important feature is the progressive drop in
the labor share of GDP . Profits are a constant share of output (because of the constant
mark-up 1/σ), but the increased use of intermediate inputs—which do not count towards
GDP—implies a decreasing GDP/Y . Since in this model, capital income corresponds
to profits, it is a growing share of GDP . Note that this happens even though machines
are not part of a capital stock in this baseline version of the model (see Appendix 7.4
for this alternative specification). For the same reason, though the low-skill labor share
drops rapidly, the high-skill labor share increases, such that the total labor share drops
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only slowly over the entire period. This is consistent with recent evidence that has seen
a drop in the labor share: Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) find a global reduction of 5
percentage points in labor’s share of corporate gross value added over the past 35 years.
Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2013) find similar results for the United States. Consistent
with recent trends (Piketty and Zucman, 2014, Piketty, 2014), the ratio of wealth to
GDP increases since profits are an increasing share of GDP (see Appendix 7.2.1). This
effect dominates a temporary increase in the interest rate. As with the skill premium
the total labor share is positively affected by increases in innovation as only high-skill
workers work in innovation.18
Growth decomposition. Figure 3 performs a growth decomposition exercise for
low-skill and high-skill wages by computing separately the instantaneous contribution
of each type of innovation. We do so by performing the following thought experiment:
at a given instant t, for given allocation of factors, suppose that all innovations of a
given type fail. By how much would the growth rates of w and v change? This exercise
is complementary to the one performed in Figure 2 which focuses on the impact of
technological levels instead of innovations.19 In Phase 1, there is little automation, so
wages growth for both skill-groups is driven almost entirely by horizontal innovation. In
Phase 2, automation sets in and an increasing number of firms substitute their low-skill
labor with machines. From this point onwards, low-skill labor is continuously reallocated
from existing products which get automated, to new, not yet automated, products.
Consequently, the immediate impact of automation on low-skill wages is negative, while
horizontal innovation has a positive impact, as it both increases the range of available
products and decreases the share of automated products. The figure also shows that
automation plays an increasing role in explaining the growth rate of high-skill wages,
while the contribution of horizontal innovation declines. This is because new products
capture a smaller and smaller share of the market and therefore do not contribute much to
the demand for high-skill labor. Consequently, automation is skill-biased while horizontal
18Interestingly, for some parameter values, the drop in the labor share is delayed relative to the rise
in the skill premium (see Appendix 7.2.2)
19More specifically we can write wt = f(Nt, Gt, H
P
t ), using equations (11) and (12). Differentiating
with respect to time and using equation (27) gives:
gwt =
(
Nt
wt
∂f
∂N
− Gt
wt
∂f
∂G
)
γHDt +
1
wt
∂f
∂G
ηGκ˜t (1−Gt)(hˆAt )κ +
1
wt
∂f
∂HP
H˙Pt .
Figure 3 plots the first two terms as the growth impact of expenses in horizontal innovation and au-
tomation, respectively. The third term ends up being negligible for our parameter choices. We perform
a similar decomposition for vt.
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innovation is unskilled-biased. We stress that this growth decomposition is for changes in
the rate of automation and horizontal innovation at a given point in time. This should
not be interpreted as “automation being harmful” to low-skill workers in general. In
fact, as we demonstrate in Section 3.5, an increase in the effectiveness of the automation
technology, η, though it might have temporary negative impact on low-skill wages, will
have positive long-term consequences.
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Figure 3: Growth decomposition. Panel A: The growth rate of low-skill wages and the in-
stantaneous contribution from horizontal innovation and automation, respectively.
Panel B is analogous for high-skill wages. See text for details.
Finally, a decomposition of gGDPt would look similar to the decomposition of g
v
t , such
that as the economy grows, automation becomes an increasingly important source of
growth. The increase in growth in Phase 2 is a result of us choosing parameters which
imply an asymptotic growth rate around the initial growth rate and is not general. Had
we chosen parameters for which asymptotic growth is slower than initial growth, the
growth rate of Phase 2 would not necessarily have been much higher than that of Phase
1 (see Appendix 7.2.3 for such a case).20
3.3 Phase 3: towards the asymptotic steady-state
Finally, we discuss the period after year 250, during which the economy approaches its
asymptotic steady state. Although the resources devoted to automation continue to
increase, eventually the growth rate in Gt slows down and Gt asymptotes a constant,
G∞(= G∗ the steady-state value), strictly below 1. The evolution of Gt results from the
20There is an ongoing debate about the potential level of long-run growth. Jones (2002) argues
that most of recent U.S. growth can be attributed to temporary factors such as a rise in educational
attainment. The present model cannot quantitatively speak to potential long-run growth, but shows
that a phase of increased automation can act as an additional temporary factor spurring higher growth.
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difference between two terms: the automation of existing products and the introduction
of new non-automated products. As long as the automation intensity is bounded there
will always be a share of products that are non-automated (see Lemma 2 below).21
The growth rates of GDPt and high-skill wages, vt, approach the same constant, and
the labor share stabilizes at a lower level than that of Phases 1 and 2.22 Both high-skill
workers and capital earn a higher share of GDP than in Phases 1 and 2, while the share
going to low-skill workers asymptotes zero (Panel D in Figure 1). The wealth/GDP
ratio, not drawn here, also stabilizes at a higher level. We represent the evolution of
the economy in (w, v) space in Figure 2c. With Gt (and H
P
t ) almost constant, the skill
premium condition does not move, while horizontal innovation continues to push out the
productivity condition. In a sharp contrast to Phase 2, low-skill wages cannot decrease,
and instead grow at a positive nearly constant rate lower than that of high-skill wages (see
Panel A). The skill premium grows unboundedly, though at a lower pace than in Phase
2 (Panel B). Further, note that there is no simple one-to-one link between automation
spending and rising inequality. Here, automation spending is higher in Phase 3 than in
Phase 2 (Panel C), yet the growth in the skill premium is slower.
In the following we show that the properties of the asymptotic steady-state can be
derived analytically and for a broader class of models than the baseline model.
3.4 Asymptotics for general technological processes
For this subsection, we consider any model where the equilibrium high-skill and low-skill
wages satisfy equations (11) and (12). That is, our analysis depends on the “static” part
of the model, but it does not rely on our particular specification for the evolution of Nt
and Gt (for instance, it holds if the R&D input is the final good instead of high-skill
workers, if some inputs are born automated or if some products become obsolete). The
following proposition gives the asymptotic growth rates of wt, GDPt and vt.
21Formally, profits of an automated firm are asymptotically proportional to output Yt divided by the
mass of firms Nt. At the same time, wages of high-skill workers are asymptotically proportional to Yt,
so that the first-order condition for automation (17) implies that Nth
A
t asymptotes a constant. It then
follows from (18) that G∞ < 1.
22Because of our choice of parameters, GDP growth is roughly the same in the first and third phases.
This is not a general feature of the model. Appendix 7.2.3 shows a case where because of the decline
in horizontal innovation, growth is lower in Phase 3 than in Phase 1. For these parameters, banning
automation would result in a higher growth rate than in laissez-faire—a result which parallels that of
Sachs and Kotlikoff (2012) or Benzell et al. (2015). Nevertheless, this case only arises because the
equilibrium allocation of scientists towards horizontal innovation is inefficient: the first best allocation
always features automation.
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Proposition 2. Consider three processes [Nt]
∞
t=0, [Gt]
∞
t=0 and [H
P
t ]
∞
t=0 where (Nt, Gt, H
P
t ) ∈
(0,∞)× [0, 1]× (0, H] for all t. Assume that Gt, gNt and HPt all admit strictly positive
limits. Then, the growth rates of high-skill wages and output admit limits with:
gv∞ = g
GDP
∞ = g
N
∞/ ((1− β)(σ − 1)) . (22)
Part A) If 0 < G∞ < 1 then the asymptotic growth rate of wt is given by
gw∞ = g
GDP
∞ / (1 + β(σ − 1)) . (23)
Part B). If G∞ = 1 and Gt converges sufficiently fast (more specifically if
limt→∞ (1−Gt)Nψ(1−µ)
−1

t exists and is finite) then :
- If  <∞ the asymptotic growth rate of wt is positive at :
gw∞ = g
GDP
∞ /, (24)
where 1 + β(σ − 1) <  by the assumption that µ < 1.23
- If low-skill workers and machines are perfect substitutes then limt→∞wt is finite
and weakly greater than ϕ˜−1 (equal to ϕ˜−1 when limt→∞ (1−Gt)Nψt = 0)
Proof. see Appendix 8.1.5.
This proposition first relates the growth rate of GDP (and high-skill wages) to the
growth rate of the number of products. Without automation GDPt would be propor-
tional to N
1/(σ−1)
t , as in a standard expanding-variety model: the higher the degree of
substitutability between inputs the lower the gain in productivity from an increase in
Nt. Here, the fact that machines, produced with the final good, are an additional in-
put creates an acceleration effect as the higher productivity also increases the supply of
machines. Asymptotically, this effect is increasing in the factor share of low-skill work-
ers/machines, β, under the conditions of Proposition 2. Moreover, for a given growth
rate of the number of products, the asymptotic growth rate of output is independent of
the share of automated firms, as long as it is strictly positive.
Second, this proposition shows that, when there is positive growth in Nt, mild as-
sumptions are sufficient to guarantee an asymptotic positive growth rate of wt. To see
why, first consider the case in which G∞ < 1, which includes the baseline model studied
23If limt→∞ (1−Gt)Nψ(1−µ)
−1

t =∞ then gGDP∞ / ≤ gw∞ ≤ gGDP∞ / (1 + β(σ − 1)) .
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prior to this subsection. Since automated and non-automated products are imperfect
substitutes, then so are machines and low-skill workers at the aggregate level. As the
aggregate production function is a nested CES with asymptotically constant weights
(see equation (4)), a growing stock of machines and a fixed supply of low-skill labor,
implies that the relative price of a worker (wt) to a machine (p
x
t ) must grow at a positive
rate. Since machines are produced with the same technology as the consumption good,
pxt = p
C
t , where p
C
t is the price of the consumption good (1 with our normalization), and
the real wage wt = wt/p
C
t = (wt/p
x
t )(p
x
t /p
C
t ) must also grow at a positive rate.
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The relative market share of automated firms and their reliance on machines also
increase, both of which ensure that low-skill wages grow at a lower rate than the economy
(see Lemma 1). This contrasts our paper with most of the literature which features a
balanced growth path and therefore does not have permanently increasing inequality. For
instance, in Acemoglu (1998), low-skill and high-skill workers are imperfect substitutes in
production. Yet, since the low-skill augmenting technology and the high-skill augmenting
technology grow at the same rate asymptotically, the relative stocks of effective units of
low-skill and high-skill labor is constant, leading to a constant relative wage.
For growing low-skill wages, a higher importance of low-skill workers (a higher β) or
a higher substitutability between automated and non-automated products (a higher σ)
imply a faster loss of competitiveness of the non-automated firms and a lower relative
growth rate of low-skill wages. The asymptotic growth rate of wt is independent of
the elasticity of substitution between machines and low-skill workers, , as the income
received by low-skill workers from automated firms becomes negligible relative to the
income earned from non-automated firms (this results from our assumption that µ < 1
such that automation reduces labor demand in a given firm).
Now, consider the case of G∞ = 1 and  < ∞ (and let convergence satisfy the
condition in Part B of Proposition 2). Then an analogous argument demonstrates that
low-skill wages must increase asymptotically, though the growth rate relative to that of
the economy must be lower than when G∞ < 1 as all firms are automated and automated
firms more readily substitute workers for machines than the economy substitutes from
non-automated to automated products. The more easily they substitute (the higher is
) the lower the growth rate of low-skill workers wages. Only in the special case in which
machines and low-skill workers are perfect substitutes in the production by automated
firms and the share of automated firms is asymptotically 1 will there be economy-wide
24A generalized version of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix 7.3 which allows for asymptotic
(negative) growth in pxt /p
C
t and thereby potentially decreasing real wages for low-skill workers.
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perfect substitution between low-skill workers and machines. In this case, wt cannot
grow asymptotically, but will still be bounded below by ϕ˜−1, since a lower wage would
imply that no firm would use machines.25
In general, the processes of Nt, Gt and H
P
t will depend on the rate at which new
products are introduced, the extent to which they are initially automated, and the rate
at which non-automated firms are automated. The following lemma derives condition
under which G∞ < 1, as in the baseline model, so that Part A of Proposition 2 applies
and in the long-run the economy looks like Phase 3 in our baseline model.
Lemma 2. Consider processes [Nt]
∞
t=0, [Gt]
∞
t=0 and [H
P
t ]
∞
t=0 , such that g
N
t and H
P
t admit
strictly positive limits. If i) the probability that a new product starts out non-automated
is bounded below away from zero and ii) the intensity at which non-automated firms are
automated is bounded above and below away from zero, then any limit of Gt must have
0 < G∞ < 1.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.6.
Under the conditions of Lemma 2, the mass of new non-automated products is posi-
tive, so that the reallocation of low-skill workers to these products ensures that their real
wage grows in the long-run. It is only in the special case of all new products starting
out automated (or equivalently the intensity with which they are automated increases
without bounds) that G∞ may be 1. In all other cases, Part A of Proposition 2 governs
the asymptotic properties of gwt .
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In return, since the crucial element in Phase 2 of the baseline model was the increase
in Gt from a low level to a level close to the steady-state value, a model which obeys
equations (11) and (12), and satisfy the conditions of Lemma 2, will also feature a period
akin to Phase 2 as long as G0 is initially low relative to the asymptotic value G∞.
25This provides one possible microfoundation for the“Android Experiment”in Brynjolfsson and McAf-
fee (2014) where an android is invented which can perform any task a human worker can do. Proposition
2 demonstrates that even if (asymptotically) this state is reached, low-skill workers will get the oppor-
tunity cost of such an android which in general will not tend to zero. Appendix 7.3 demonstrates that
a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for low-skill wages to approach zero is that the cost of
machines/androids falls faster than the consumption good. Using the derivations in Appendix 8.7 one
can show that the fact that our machines are intermediate inputs and androids would be capital is
immaterial for the argument.
26Interestingly, the intuition given by the combination of Lemma 2 and Part A of Proposition 2 does
not rely on our assumption that new products are born identical to older products. In a model where
new products are born more productive, the growth rate of high-skill wages and low-skill wages will
obey equations (22) and (23), as long as the intensity at which non-automated firms get automated is
bounded and the economy grows at a positive but finite rate.
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3.5 Sensitivity analysis
We now revert back to our specific baseline model, and study different scenarios. Ap-
pendix 7.2.5, carries out a more systematic comparative statics exercise.
Declining low-skill wages. Our model can accommodate declining low-skill wages
in Phase 2. An easy way to generate this pattern is to introduce the externality in
automation. Figure 4 shows the evolution of the economy when κ˜ = 0.49.27 Since the
automation technology is initially quite unproductive (as Gt is small), Phase 2 now starts
much later. Yet, it is also much more intense, partly because of the sharp increase in
the productivity of the automation technology (following the increase in Gt) and partly
because low-skill wages are higher when it starts. As a result, low-skill wages decrease
for part of Phase 2. This is both because automation is more intense and horizontal
innovation less. First, the increase in Gt is accelerated so that in Figure 2b, the skill-
premium condition pivots counter-clockwise faster (the aggregate substitution effect).
The accelerated increase in Gt also pushes out the productivity-condition (the aggregate
scale effect), which explains the high growth rates for vt and GDPt. Following our
discussion in section 3.2, the substitution effect dominates the scale effect once Gt is
large enough resulting in a drop in wt—accordingly, the drop in g
w
t is delayed compared
to the increase in automation. Second, horizontal innovation drops considerably, both
because new firms are less competitive than their automated counterparts, and because
the high demand for high-skill workers for automation increases the cost of inventing
a new product. Yet, the decline in wt lowers the profit ratio, which in return tends to
lower automation. This reflects a general point: just as increases in wt tend to encourage
automation; so do reductions in wt discourage the same automation and reduce pressure
on low-skill wages.
Importantly, gwt < 0 is also possible (though only for a small parameter set) without
the externality (κ˜ = 0) for other parameter choices—see Appendix 7.2.4 for an example.
This is possible because automation expenses are an upfront investment. Therefore
the level of low-skill wages depends on the current stock of knowledge, but it affects
innovation and thereby the future stock of knowledge. In contrast, a model where
automation expenses take the form of a cost to be paid every period will have a harder
time generating decreasing low-skill wages without an externality, because lower low-skill
27We choose this value for κ˜ instead of 0.5, because in that case there is no horizontal innovation for
some time periods (that is (19) holds with a strict inequality). This is not an issue in principle but
simulating this case would require a different numerical approach.
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wages would reduce the incentive to pay this cost, and thereby prevent low-skill wages
from dropping.
0 100 200 300 400
0
2
4
6
8
Year
Pe
r c
en
t
Panel A: Growth Rates of Wages and GDP
 
 
gGDP
gw
gv
0 100 200 300 4000
2
4
6
Panel B: Profit ratio and Skillpremium
Year
lo
g 
un
its
 
 
profit ratio
skillpremium
0 100 200 300 4000
5
10
15
Pe
r c
en
t
Year
 
 
0
50
100
Year
Panel C: Research Expenditures and G
 
Autom./GDP (left)
Hori./GDP (left)
G (right)
0 100 200 300 4000
50
100
Year
Pe
r c
en
t
Panel D: Factor Shares
 
 
Total labor share
Low−skill labor share
Figure 4: Transitional Dynamics. Note: Same as for Figure 1 but with an automation exter-
nality of κ˜ = 0.49.
Innovation parameters. Figure 5 shows the impact of the innovation technology
parameters by considering the separate cases of a higher productivity for the automation
technology η=0.4 (instead of 0.2) and of a higher productivity for horizontal innovation
γ = 0.32 (instead of 0.3). For each case, Panels A-C show the value of selected outcomes
relative to the baseline case. A higher productivity for the automation technology η
initially has no impact during Phase 1, but it moves Phase 2 forward as investing in
automation technology starts being profitable for a lower level of low-skill wages. Since
automation occurs sooner, the absolute level of low-skill wages drops relative to the
baseline case (Panel B), which leads to a fast increase in the skill premium. A higher η
also leads to a higher growth-rate asymptotically: it increases the value of a new firm (for
a given innovation rate) since new firms are more likely to automate, which, in turn, leads
to a faster rate of horizontal innovation (we prove this result analytically in Appendix
8.1.7).28 A faster rate of horizontal innovation implies that the skill premium keeps
28This assumes that η is large enough for an equilibrium of the type described in Proposition 1 to
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increasing relative to the baseline, but also that low-skill wages are eventually larger than
in the baseline case. Therefore, a more productive automation technology only hurts low-
skill workers temporarily, while they benefit in the long-run. A higher productivity for
horizontal innovation implies that GDP grows faster than in the baseline (Panel A), and
with it low-skill wages (Panel B) as well as the skill premium. Therefore Phase 2 starts
sooner, which explains why the skill premium jumps relative to the baseline case before
increasing smoothly.
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Figure 5: Deviations from baseline model for more productive horizontal innovation technol-
ogy (γ) and more productive automation technology (η).
3.6 Social planner’s problem
Here, we briefly discuss the social planner’s problem associated with our model (Ap-
pendix 8.3 gives more details). The social planner’s solution looks qualitatively similar
to the equilibrium we described, so that our results are not driven by the market struc-
ture we imposed. In particular, when the economy is initially endowed with low levels
of technology N0, G0, the transitional dynamics still feature the three phases described
for the equilibrium case. There are four market imperfections that the social planner
corrects: a monopoly distortion, a positive externality in horizontal innovation from the
total number of products, a positive externality in the automation technology from the
total number of products (the term Nκt ) and a positive externality in the automation
technology from the share of automated products when κ˜ > 0 (which we referred so far
as the “automation externality”). The optimal allocation can be decentralized using a
subsidy to the use of intermediates inputs of 1/σ (to correct for the monopoly distor-
tion), a positive subsidy to horizontal innovation (to correct for the two externalities
arising from the number of products), and, if κ˜ > 0, a positive subsidy to automation
exist—therefore this statement does not contradict our earlier statement that with η = 0 growth may
be higher.
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(when κ˜ = 0 there is no externality arising from automation and therefore no subsidy);
all subsidies are financed with lump-sum taxes.29
3.7 Discussion
Automation of new products. The evolution of the economy through the three
phases does not depend on our assumption that new products are born non-automated.
To emphasize this further, we present in Appendix 8.4 an alternative model where au-
tomation can only occur at the entry stage: when a firm is born, its owner can make
it automated with probability min(η(Nth
A
t )
κ, 1) by hiring hAt high-skill workers in au-
tomation. The economy goes through three phases as in the original model. As low-skill
wages increase, the benefit from automation increases as well, and while initially most
firms are born non-automated, over time more and more are born automated, until this
share stabilizes towards its asymptotic steady-state value. In this alternative model,
new firms are more likely to be automated than older ones. Since automation does not
take time, for some parameter values, all firms are eventually born automated, so that
G∞ = 1; in all cases, the asymptotic dynamics are still governed by Proposition 2.
Episodes of decreasing skill premium. Our baseline model implies an increasing
skill-premium, which has not always been the case historically. An immediate explana-
tion is a changing relative supply of skills. Goldin and Katz (2008) show that incor-
porating changes in the supply of skills into a model of skill-biased technical change
captures well the evolution of the skill premium throughout the 20th century. In some
cases though, automation itself did not aim at replacing the most unskilled workers, as
exemplified by the mechanization of the 19th century, which replaced skilled artisans
(including the Luddites), or the computerization of the last 30 years. The next section,
which introduces a group of middle-skill workers, helps us account for such events.
Episodes of decreasing capital share and capital income ratio. Similarly,
empirically, the capital share of income and the capital income ratio seem to have followed
a U-curve in the 20th century (Piketty and Zucman, 2014 and Piketty, 2014). Although
a small temporary decline in the capital share can be accounted for by the model (see
Appendix 7.2.2), such large movements cannot. Yet, the earlier decrease in the capital
share and the capital income ratio was partly due to the two World Wars and to changes
29The existence of externalities naturally leads to questions of public policy. Although, outside the
scope of the present paper, we plan to work on an extension which allows policy to address externalities
as well as inequality.
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in the tax system. Besides, the transition away from the agricultural sector (and therefore
the reduced importance of land) played a crucial role, which we have not modeled.
Automating all production tasks. Naturally, some of the production tasks per-
formed by high-skill workers may also be automatable and the following section discusses
this case briefly. In the present model, the share of automatable tasks is parametrized
by β, so that if β = 1 all production tasks (even those of CEOs) can eventually be au-
tomated. In this case, the economy reaches a “world of plenty” in finite time, as infinite
production is possible once the number of products N is sufficiently large relative to the
productivity parameter ϕ˜. This does not seem realistic and in reality, one may think that
other factors such as natural resources or land would then become the binding factor.
Structural shifts. The present model imposes that all products are equally substi-
tutable with an elasticity greater than 1, implying that a firm that automates captures
a larger market share. Historically, different sectors have experienced automation at dif-
ferent points in time. This could be captured with a nested structure with an elasticity
of substitution between broad sectors of less than 1. If these sectors differ in how easy it
is to automate their intermediate inputs, then the phases of intense automation will hap-
pen sequentially. As one broad sector experiences intense automation, spending shares
in non-automated sectors would increase (as in Acemoglu and Guerrieri, 2008) securing
a higher growth rate for low-skill wages. Besides, such an economy could replicate the
broad features of an economy switching from agriculture, to manufacturing, and then
services, and could generate interesting dynamics for the capital share.
Comparison with Acemoglu and Restrepo (2015). In ongoing work, Acemoglu
and Restreppo (2015) build a model with automation and the creation of new tasks.
Automation plays a similar role in both papers (although in their baseline version, there
is only one type of labor), but while in our model new tasks (new products) add up to
the stock of existing ones, in their model new tasks are more complex version of existing
ones. These new tasks are born non-automated (as in our paper) but with a higher
labor productivity (contrary to our paper) which allows them to replace their previous
automated vintage. With increasing labor productivity in successive vintages of tasks
and under the appropriate assumptions regarding the innovation technology, their model
features a stable steady-state.30 Their model is therefore one where the economy self-
corrects: if a temporary shock leads to more automation in the short-run, lower wages
30For this it is crucial that the higher productivity of more complex tasks applies only to labor and
not machines. In our model this would be as if in equation (2) there were a labor productivity coefficient
γ(i) in front of l(i) which increases exponentially with i.
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will reduce further incentives to automate, ensuring that the economy goes back to its
steady-state with balanced growth. Yet, it cannot explain the origin of such a shock
and therefore cannot be used to account for recent trends such as a drop in the labor
share or a possible rise in automation innovation. By contrast our model endogenously
explains why automation may become more prevalent as an economy develops.31
In the rest of the paper, we present two extensions of the baseline model: the first
one includes middle-skill workers and allows the model to account for wage polarization,
the second one introduces an endogenous supply response in the skill distribution, and
is used to perform a quantitative exercise. Besides, Appendix 7.3 presents an extension
where the production technology for machines and the consumption good differ, and
Appendix 7.4 presents an extension where machines are part of a capital stock.
4 Middle-Skill Workers and Wage Polarization
As mentioned in the introduction, a recent literature (e.g. Autor et. al., 2006 and
Autor and Dorn, 2013) argues that since the 1990s, wage polarization has taken place:
inequality has kept rising in the top half of the distribution, but it has narrowed for the
lower half. They conjecture that these “middle-skill”-workers are performing cognitive
routine tasks which are the most easily automated. Our model suggests a related, but
distinct explanation: automating the tasks performed by middle-skill workers is not
easier, but more difficult and therefore happened later. Hence, before 1990 and in fact
for most of the 20th century low-skill workers were in the process of being replaced by
machines as semi-automated factories, mechanical farming, household appliances etc
were increasingly used, whereas since the 1990s, computers are replacing middle-skill
workers.32 As such our model can explain how a phase of wage polarization can follow
one of a uniform increase in wage inequality.
To make this precise, we introduce a mass M of middle-skill workers into the model.
We think of these workers as being sequentially ranked such that high-skill workers can
31Although this is not the focus of our paper, our model also features elements of self-correction in
the presence of exogenous shocks. For instance, in the case with no automation externality (κ˜ = 0), a
positive exogenous shock on Gt will be followed by a period where automation is relatively less intense
(as the skill premium would have declined), so that eventually the asymptotic share of automated
products stays the same.
32In fact, Figure 3 in Autor and Dorn (2013) shows that low-skill workers left non-service occupa-
tions from the 70’s, which is consistent with the view that their tasks in non-service occupations were
automated before the middle-skill workers’ tasks.
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perform all tasks, middle-skill workers can perform middle-skill tasks and low-skill tasks,
and low-skill workers can perform only low-skill tasks. All newly introduced intermediate
products continue to be non-automated, but there is an exogenous probability δ that they
require low-skill and high-skill workers as described before, and a probability 1− δ that
they require both middle-skill and high-skill workers in an analogous manner. We refer
to the former type of products as “low-skill products” and the latter type as “middle-skill
products”. This gives the following production functions (for i ∈ [0, Nt]):
yL(i) =
[
l(i)
−1
 + α(i) (ϕ˜Lx(i))
−1

] β
−1
h(i)1−β,
yM(i) =
[
m(i)
−1
 + α(i) (ϕ˜Mx(i))
−1

] β
−1
h(i)1−β,
where yL(i) and yM(i) are the production of low-skill and middle-skill products, respec-
tively, and m(i) is the use of middle-skill workers by a firm of the latter type. ϕ˜L and
ϕ˜M are the productivity of machines that replace low-skill and middle-skill workers, re-
spectively. The mass of low-skill products is δN , the mass of middle-skill products is
(1 − δ)N (alternatively all products could be produced by all factors; this would make
the analysis substantially more complicated without altering the underlying argument).
The final good is still produced competitively by a CES aggregator of all intermediate
inputs, and all machines are produced one-for-one with the final good keeping a constant
price of 1. The shares of automated products, GL and GM will in general differ.
Both types of producers have access to an automation technology as before, but we al-
low the productivity to differ, such that automation happens with intensity ηLG
κ˜
L(Nh
A
L)
κ
for low-skill products and ηMG
κ˜
M(Nh
A
M)
κ for middle-skill products. The equilibrium is
defined analogously to section 2.5 and a proposition analogous to Proposition 1 exists.
To describe the equilibrium, we combine simulation methods and analytical results
as in section 3. We want to analyze a situation where low-skill and middle-skill workers
are symmetric except that middle-skill workers’ tasks are more difficult to automate.
To do this, we choose δ = 1/2 and set L = M = 1/3 and keep parameters as before
except that we choose ϕ˜M = 0.15 and ϕ˜L = 0.3, so that machines are less productive
in middle-skill products than in low-skill ones. The situation would be similar had we
chosen ϕ˜M = ϕ˜L, but ηM < ηL such that the automation technology for middle-skill
firms is less productive. Figure 6 describes the equilibrium in the presence of a large
externality in the automation technology (κ˜ = 0.5).
The overall picture is similar to that of Figure 4, but with distinct paths for low-skill
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and middle-skill wages denoted w and u. One can now distinguish 4 phases. Phase 1
is analogous to Phase 1 in the previous case, and all wages grow at roughly the same
rate. From around year 200, low-skill wages become sufficiently high, that low-skill
product firms start investing in automation and GL starts growing. Yet, since machines
are less productive in middle-skill workers’ tasks, GM stays low until around year 300.
During this second phase, inequality increases uniformly, high-skill wages grow faster
than middle-skill wages which again grow faster than low-skill wages. Middle-skill wages
do not grow as fast as GDP because automation in low-skill products increases their
market share at the expense of the middle-skill products. From around year 300, the
economy enters a third phase, where automation in middle-skill products is now intense.
As a result, the growth rate of middle-skill wages drops further, such that low-skill wages
actually grow faster than middle-skill wages (all along vt ≥ ut ≥ wt, so no group has
an incentive to be employed below its skill level).33 However, depending on parameters,
the polarization phase need not be as salient as here (for instance, there is barely any
polarization when there is no externality in automation, κ˜ = 0, but the other parameters
are kept identical, see Appendix 7.2.6 for this case).
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Figure 6: Transitional dynamics with middle-skill workers in the presence of an automation
externality (κ˜ = 0.5).
Finally, in a fourth Phase (from around year 450), GL and GM are close to their
steady-state levels and the economy approaches the asymptotic steady-state, with low-
skill and middle-skill wages growing positively but at a rate lower than that of the
economy. Proposition 2 can be extended to this case. High-skill wages and GDP all
grow at the same rate which depends on the growth rate of the number of products,
33Empirically, the polarization looks more like a J curve than a U curve as the difference in growth
rates of wages between the bottom and the middle of the income distribution is modest. Here as well,
high-skill wages grow faster than both low-skill and middle-skill wages from the beginning of Phase 2.
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while low-skill and middle-skill wages grow at a lower rate such that:
gv∞ = g
GDP
∞ = ψg
N
∞ and g
w
∞ = g
u
∞ = g
GDP
∞ / (1 + β(σ − 1)) .
Our assumption that automation is intrinsically easier for firms hiring low-skill work-
ers than for those hiring middle-skill workers (ϕ˜M < ϕ˜L or ηM < ηL) may seem at odds
with empirical papers which argue that automation now predominantly hurts middle-skill
workers. Our model emphasizes that the intensity of automation and the technological
possibilities for automation are different concepts, since the intensity of automation does
not depend only on its cost but also on its benefit. Hence, in the third phase of our sim-
ulation, middle-skill products get automated more intensively than low-skill products,
even though automating low-skill products is less costly.
Yet, some papers argue that the technological opportunities for automation them-
selves are today lower for low-skill than for middle-skill workers. This is easy to reconcile
with our model if we assume that for both types of products, a common fixed share can
never be automated (for instance because the associated tasks are not routine enough).
After the start of Phase 2, the share of low-skill workers hired in products that can
never be automated will be larger than the corresponding share for middle-skill workers
(since a higher share of low-skill products will already have been automated), and as a
result, it will be on average easier to automate a middle-skill product than a low-skill
one. That is, middle-skill workers end up performing on average more routine tasks that
are currently being automated (as emphasized by the literature), but this is only the
case because the routine tasks that were performed by low-skill workers and that could
be automated have already been largely automated.
Naturally, the phase of intense automation of middle-skill products may occur sooner
than that of low-skill products (for instance if the supply of middle-skill workers is low
enough to generate a large middle-skill over low-skill wage ratio). This may be what
happened in the 19th century when the tasks of (middle-skilled) artisans got automated,
as their wages were high relative to that of unskilled workers.34
Automating some high-skill tasks. Alternatively, one may assume that middle-
skill and high-skill workers are identical and therefore use this framework to analyze the
case where some high-skill production tasks are automatable—in particular, if β is close
34These unskilled workers were often used to operate the machines which replaced the artisans. Our
model does not currently account for this as low-skill and middle-skill workers are hired in different
firms, but it would in the extension where all products use the three types of workers.
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to (but smaller than) 1, such a model would capture the situation where all production
tasks except for headquarter services are automatable. Then, automation will affect in
turn both low-skill and high-skill products, with the order depending on the relative
wage of both and the relative effectiveness of the two automation technologies. One
crucial difference with the middle-skill case is that as some high-skill workers’ tasks
remain non-automatable (in production and in research), their wage in the long-run still
grows at the same rate as GDP so that the skill premium is asymptotically infinite.
5 Quantitative Exercise
In this section, we conduct a quantitative exercise to compare empirical trends for the
United States for the past 50 years with the predictions of our model using Bayesian
techniques. As argued in Goldin and Katz (2008), during this period the relative supply
of skilled workers increased dramatically so we allow workers to switch between skill-
types in response to changes in factor rewards.
5.1 An endogenous supply response in the skill distribution
Specifically, let there be a unit mass of heterogeneous individuals, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]
each endowed with lH¯ units of low-skill labor and Γ (j) = H¯ (1+q)
q
j1/q units of high-
skill labor (the exact distribution of high-skill ability is of no crucial importance). The
parameter q > 0 governs the shape of the ability distribution with q → ∞ implying
equal distribution of skills and q < ∞ implying a ranking of increasing endowments of
high-skill on [0, H¯(1 + q)/q]. Proposition 1 can be extended to this case and in fact the
steady state values (G∗, hˆA∗, gN∗, χ∗) are the same as in the model with a fixed high-skill
labor supply H¯. Proposition 2 also applies except that the asymptotic growth rate of
low-skill wages is higher (see Appendix 8.5):
gv∞ = g
GDP
∞ = ψg
N
∞ and g
w
∞ =
1 + q
1 + q + β(σ − 1)g
GDP
∞ . (25)
At all points in time there exists an indifferent worker (j¯t) where wt = (1 + q)/q(j¯t)
1/qvt,
with all j ≤ j¯t working as low-skill workers and all j > j¯t working as high-skill work-
ers. This introduces an endogenous supply response as the diverging wages for low- and
high-skill workers encourage shifts from low-skill to high-skill jobs. The gradual reduc-
tion in supply dampens the relative decline in low-skill wages. Hence, besides securing
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themselves a higher future wage growth, low-skill workers who switch to a high-skill
occupation also benefit the remaining low-skill workers.
Note that as all changes in the stock of labor are driven by demand-side effects, wages
and employment will move in the same direction. Extending our analysis of middle-skill
workers to allow for switches between sectors of employment would therefore reproduce
the employment patterns of “job polarization” in addition to wage polarization.
5.2 Bayesian estimation
For this exercise (and this exercise only), we use education groups as a proxy for skill
groups. That is, as is common in the literature, we identify low-skill workers with
non-college educated workers and high-skill workers with college educated workers. We
match the skill-premium and the ratio of skilled to non-skilled workers (both calculated
using the methodology of Acemoglu and Autor, 2011) as well as the growth rate of real
GDP/employment and the share of labor in total GDP (both taken from the National
Income and Products Accounts). We further associate the use of machines with private
equipment (real private non-residential equipment, “Table 2.2. Chain-type Quantity
Indexes” from NIPA). All time series start in 1963 when the skill-premium and skill-
ratio are first available and until 2007 to avoid the Great Recession. We match the
accumulated growth rate of private equipment by indexing both X and real private
equipment to 100 in 1963.35
Due to the relatively small sample size we use Bayesian techniques to estimate our
model, though little would change if we instead employed Maximum Likelihood proce-
dures (in fact since we choose a uniform prior the maximum likelihood point estimate
is equal to the mode of the Bayesian estimator). The model presented until now is not
inherently stochastic, and in order to bring it to the data, we add normally distributed
auto-correlated measurement errors. That is, we consider an economy where the un-
derlying structure is described deterministically by our model, but the econometrician
only observes variables with normally distributed auto-correlated measurement errors.
With a full parametrization of the model the parameters are not uniquely identified and
35The use of machines, X, has no natural units and we can therefore not match the level of X.
Alternatively, we could normalize X by GDP, but we do no think of equipment as the direct empirical
counter-part of X. First, equipment is a stock, whereas X is better thought of as a flow variable.
Second many aspects of automation might not be directly captured in equipment. Hence, equipment
is better thought of as a proxy for X that grows in proportion to X. Empirically, equipment/GDP is
about twice that of our predicted value of X/GDP .
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we restrict H¯ = 1 without loss of generality. Therefore, our deterministic model has 14
parameters including n0 and G0. Including two parameters (variance and correlation)
for each of the five measurement errors, this leaves us with 24 parameters.36 This gives
a joint distribution of the observed variables given parameters and, with a chosen prior,
standard Bayesian methods can be employed to find the posterior distribution (see Ap-
pendix 8.8 for a full description of the procedure as well as domain on the prior uniform
distribution). The domain of the prior is deliberately kept wide for parameters not easily
recovered from other studies such as the characteristics of the automation technology.
Table 2 shows the mode of the posterior distribution. The unconditional posterior
distribution of each parameter is shown in Figure 22 in Appendix 8.8, which demonstrates
that variance for the posterior unconditional distribution is generally small.
Table 2: The mode of the posterior distribution.
σ µ β l γ κ˜ θ η κ ρ ϕ q
Mode 4.17 0.66 0.76 0.91 0.20 0.29 2.09 0.27 0.72 0.058 8.60 0.82
n0 G0 ρ1 σ
2
1 ρ2 σ
2
2 ρ3 σ
2
3 ρ4 σ
2
4 ρ5 σ
2
5
Mode 0.49 0.59 0.97 0.01 0.99 0.026 0.96 0.001 0.24 0.0004 0.97 0.051
Note: (σ2i , ρi), i = 1, ..., 5 estimate refer to skill-premium, skill-ratio, labor share of GDP,
growth rate of GDP/employment, and Real Private Equipment, respectively.
Three parameter estimates are worth noting. First, the parameter of the automation
externality, κ˜, is centered around 0.29 implying a substantial automation externality, a
force for an accelerated Phase 2. Second, G0 is centered around 0.59 implying that Phase
2 was already well underway in the early 1960s. Finally, the estimate of β—the factor
share to machines/low-skill workers— of 0.76 implies substantial room for automation.
Figure 7 further shows the predicted path of the matched data series along with
their empirical counterparts at the mode of the posterior distribution. Panel A demon-
strates that the model matches the rise in the skill-premium from the late 1970s onwards
36More specifically, for time period t = 1, ...T , let (Y t1 , ..., Y
t
M ) ∈ RM×T be a vector of M predicted
variables with time paths of Y tm = (Ym,s)
t
s=1 for m ∈ {1, ...,M} and Y t = (Y t1 , ..., Y tM ). Let the complete
set of parameters in the deterministic model be bP ∈ BP ⊂ RK . We can then write the predicted values
as Y Tm (bP ), for m = 1, ...M . We add normally distributed measurement errors with zero mean to get
the predicted values as Yˆ Tm = Y
T
m + 
T
m, where 
T
m ∼ N(0,Σm) and Σm is the covariance matrix of the
measurement errors. The errors are independent across types, E[T
′
m 
T
n ] = 0, for m 6= n, but potentially
auto-correlated: the elements of Σm are such that the t, t
′-element of Σm is given by σ2mρ
|t−t′|
m , where
σ2m > 0 and −1 < ρm < 1. Hence, σ2m is the unconditional variance of a measurement error for variable
m and ρm is its auto-correlation. This gives a total of 2M stochastic parameters and we label the
combined set of these and bP as b ∈ B ⊂ R2M+K . This leads to a joint probability density for Yˆ T of
f(Yˆ T |b) = ΠMm=1fm(Yˆ Tm |b) and with a uniform prior f(b|Yˆ T ) ∝ f(Yˆ T |b)
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Figure 7: Predicted and Empirical time paths
reasonably well, but misses the flat skill-premium in the period before. As argued in
Goldin and Katz (2008), the flat skill-premium in this period is best understood as the
consequence of a large increase in the stock of college-educated workers caused by other
factors than technological change (the Vietnam war and the increase in female college
enrollment). Correspondingly, our model, which only allows relative supply to respond
to relative factor rewards, fails to capture a substantial increase in the relative stock of
skilled labor in the 1960s and early 1970s (Panel B). More importantly, the model pre-
dicts a substantially higher drop in the labor share of GDP than what has been observed
empirically (14 versus 5 percentage points). The simple structure of the model forces
any increase in the use of machines to be reflected in a drop in the labor share of GDP.
A number of extensions would allow for more flexibility. For example, one could allow
either for physical capital such as buildings or land, for an elasticity of substitution lower
than 1 between high-skill labor and the low-skill - machines aggregate in production, or
explicitly model several sectors as discussed in Section 3.7. The model matches the aver-
age growth rate of GDP/employment, but as a long-run growth model, is obviously not
capable of matching the short-run fluctuations around trend (Panel D). Panel E shows
that the model captures the exponential growth in private equipment very well—this is
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not an automatic consequence of matching the GDP/employment growth rate as equip-
ment has been growing by around 1 percentage point more than GDP since 1963. Our
exercise is qualitatively different from that of Krusell et al. (2000). While they take
time paths of factors of production as given (labor inputs, structures and equipment),
we consider them to be endogenous and restricted to obey the structure of the model.
Figure 8 plots the transitional dynamics from 1960 to 2060. Panel A shows that the
skill ratio and the skill premium are predicted to keep growing at nearly constant rates,
while the labor share is to stabilize at a slightly lower level than today. Panel B suggests
that the share of automated products today is not far from its steady-state value.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced automation in a horizontal innovation growth model. We
showed that in such a framework, the economy will undertake a structural break. After
an initial phase with stable income inequality and stable factor shares, automation picks
up. During this second phase, the skill premium increases, low-skill wages stagnate and
possibly decline, the labor share drops—all consistent with the US experience in the
past 50 years—and growth starts relying increasingly on automation. In a third phase,
the share of automated products stabilizes, but the economy still features a constant
shift of low-skill employment from recently automated firms to as of yet non-automated
firms. With a constant and finite aggregate elasticity of substitution between low-skill
workers and machines, low-skill wages grow in the long-run. When the supply-side of
the economy is allowed to respond, similar results carry through, but the rise in the
skill premium is associated with a rise in the skill ratio which partly mitigates it. Wage
polarization can be accounted for once the model is extended to include middle-skill
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workers.
The model shows that there is a long-run tendency for technical progress to displace
substitutable labor, here low-skill labor by assumption (this is a point made by Ray, 2014,
in a critique of Piketty, 2014), but this only occurs if the wages of the workers which
can be substituted for are large relative to the price of machines. This in turn can only
happen under three scenarios: either automation must itself increase the wages of these
workers (the scale effect dominates the substitution effect), or there is another source of
technological progress (here, horizontal innovation), or technological progress allows a
reduction in the price of machines relative to the consumption good. Importantly, when
machines are produced with a technology similar to the consumption good, automation
can only reduce wages temporarily: a prolonged drop in wages would end the incentives
to automate in the first place.
Fundamentally, the economy in our model undertakes an endogenous structural
change when low-skill wages become sufficiently high. This distinguishes our paper
from most of the literature, which seeks to explain changes in the distribution of income
inequality through exogenous changes: an exogenous increase in the stock of equipment
as per Krusell et al. (2000), a change in the relative supply of skills, as per Acemoglu
(1998), or the arrival of a general purpose technology as in the associated literature.
This makes our paper closer in spirit to the work of Buera and Kaboski (2012), who
argue that the increase in income inequality is linked to the increase in the demand for
high-skill intensive services, which results from non-homotheticities in consumption.
The present paper is a first step towards a better understanding of the links between
automation, growth and income inequality. In future research, we will extend it to
consider policy implications. The simple sensitivity analysis on the automation technol-
ogy (section 3.5) suggests that capital taxation will have non-trivial implications in this
context. Automation and technological development are also intrinsically linked to the
international economy. Our framework could be used to study the recent phenomenon
of “reshoring”, where US companies that had offshored their low-skill intensive activities
to China, now start repatriating their production to the US after having further auto-
mated their production process. Finally, our framework could also be used to study the
impact of automation along the business cycle: Jaimovich and Siu (2012) argue that the
destruction of the “routine” jobs happens during recessions, which raises the question of
whether automation is responsible for the recent “jobless recovery”.
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